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CHARLES KOCH, JR.—THE CASEBOOK AND
THE SCHOLARSHIP
William S. Jordan, III*
Charles Koch, Jr. wrote a unique casebook. Seventeen years before the Carnegie
Report,1 Charles published a casebook through which students learn by doing what
lawyers do when they practice administrative law.2 They represent clients, both agen-
cies and those who deal with agencies. They also engage in the internal processes
of the agency, developing procedures, providing legal guidance, and negotiating the
often Byzantine interactions of political appointees, technical experts, and strong-
minded colleagues.
Charles created a new agency, the Wine Trade Commission.3 He peopled the
Commission and the related wine industry and consumer interests with characters many
of us would recognize. We see them as they struggle through the constitutional issues
raised by the Wine Trade Commission Act, the development of agency policies and
procedures, implementation of rulemaking and enforcement actions, and judicial re-
view, to the eventual departure of two of the lead characters for jobs in Cleveland.4
When I first read the simulation, I was struck by how real it seemed. I knew these
people. I did what they were doing. I have often wondered how much the simulation
reflected what Charles experienced in Washington. His untimely death provides the un-
wanted opportunity to explore that question and the larger question of what we can
learn about Charles from his casebook and his scholarship. I begin with a review of his
career up to the creation of the casebook.
I. THE FTC TO WILLIAM & MARY
Having been raised in a Maryland suburb of Washington, D.C., Charles received
his B.A. from the University of Maryland in 1966.5 He then earned his J.D. from the
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and C. Blake McDowell Professor of Law,
University of Akron School of Law.
1 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION
OF LAW (2007).
2 See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter CASEBOOK (2d ed.)].
3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., TEACHER’S MANUAL, ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS, at ii, S-1–S-18 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter TEACHER’S
MANUAL (2d ed.)].
4 Id.; see also CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & WILLIAM S. JORDAN, III, TEACHER’S MANUAL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS Lesson 8B.1, at 709 (4th ed. 2003).
5 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Curriculum Vitae, http://law.wm.edu/documents/directory/koch-44
.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Charles H. Koch, Jr., Curriculum Vitae].
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George Washington University Law Center, graduating with Honors in 1969.6
Charles joined the staff of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1969, serving for
three years in the Bureau of Consumer Protection and three years in the Office of
General Counsel.7
It was an interesting time to join the FTC. The previous year, Nader’s Raiders had
issued The Nader Report,8 which lambasted the FTC as “fat with cronyism, torpid
through an inbreeding unusual even for Washington, manipulated by the agents of com-
mercial predators, [and] impervious to governmental and citizen monitoring.”9 Nader’s
Raiders consisted of six law students or law school graduates and one recent graduate
of Princeton, Edward F. Cox, Jr., who would go on to marry Tricia Nixon and build a
very successful career.10 The others included Judith Areen, later Dean of Georgetown
University Law Center; Peter Bradford, later a member of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; and William Howard Taft IV, later Acting Secretary of Defense and
Ambassador to NATO.11
Surely The Nader Report itself was an inspiration to Charles as a recent graduate
joining the FTC. Moreover, just as Charles was graduating from George Washington,
President Nixon asked the American Bar Association (ABA) to conduct a “professional
appraisal of the present efforts of the Federal Trade Commission in the field of con-
sumer protection . . . to be delivered by September 15, 1969.”12 After the ABA con-
firmed The Nader Report findings,13 President Nixon appointed Caspar Weinberger
as Chairman of the FTC with a mandate for the “reactivation and revitalization of the
FTC.”14 Weinberger was followed later that year by Miles Kirkpatrick, who had chaired
the ABA Commission that had confirmed the work of Nader’s Raiders.15 As described
by Edward Cox, Weinberger and Kirkpatrick
consolidated operations into two principal operating bureaus
(Competition and Consumer Protection), upgraded the Bureau of
Economics to apply sound economic analysis to those operations,
established a planning office to set priorities, revamped and up-
graded the regional offices to enable local enforcement initiatives,
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 EDWARD F. COX ET AL., ‘THE NADER REPORT’: ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION (1969).
9 Id. at vii.
10 See Edward F. Cox—Chairman, REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE, http://www
.nygop.org/page/edward-f-cox (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
11 Edward F. Cox, Reinvigorating the FTC: The Nader Report and the Rise of Consumer
Advocacy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 899 n.2 (2005).
12 Id. at 905 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 Id. (citing ABA, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969)).
14 Id. at 906.
15 Id.
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and, most importantly, attracted capable young attorneys with a
strong commitment to consumer protection.16
Charles was one of the capable young attorneys at the Commission. One of his
closest colleagues was David W. Penn, an economist who also joined the FTC in 1969
and served in the Bureau of Economics while Charles was in the Office of General
Counsel. Mr. Penn later went from the FTC to the Department of Energy, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, to service as the General Manager of Wisconsin Public
Power, Inc., and Executive Vice President of the American Public Power Association.17
Charles was in excellent company.
As Mr. Penn put it in a recent interview, “dawn came” as Weinberger and Kirkpat-
rick did a great job cleaning up a moribund agency and building trust and pride in its
mission and operations.18 It was a very exciting time for both of them.19 The two of
them worked on data requests, responses to Congress, and the Pre-Merger Notification
Program as mergers were happening at a furious pace. Charles loved policy and eco-
nomics. Mr. Penn kept the data and reports that developed into the Pre-Merger Notifica-
tion Program, while Charles was responsible for developing the rules.20 At one point in
the early days, John Kenneth Galbraith came to a brown-bag lunch and told them
the FTC was just a token.21 They felt they were working hard for the public against
strong odds.
According to Mr. Penn, Charles felt his work at the FTC was an important public
service. He felt that the agency was too oriented toward legal process to do much at
first. Charles asked, “What could we do, what would the law allow,” particularly as to
economic issues.22 Mr. Penn described Charles as “bimodal.”23 On the one hand, he
mused on the great economic policy issues. On the other, he had a “bear trap mind,”
able to bring the larger issues down to what he could do in terms of procedures.24 He
was interested in how the parts of government worked together and how to make gov-
ernment better and more effective. Once a goal was defined, Charles had a very good
sense about how to facilitate achieving it.
When I asked whether Charles was an idealist, Mr. Penn responded that he was
“too much of a realist and a bit of a cynic.”25 However cynical, he had a wry sense of
16 Id.
17 Telephone Interview with David W. Penn, Retired, Wis. Pub. Power, Inc. & Am. Pub.
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humor, and “his eyes always twinkled.”26 He was sensible—“let’s build the blocks to
make it happen.”27 Charles “did not want to be anywhere where he wasn’t accomplish-
ing something,” which Mr. Penn believes pushed him to pursue the LL.M. he earned
at the University of Chicago in 1975 just before joining the faculty at DePaul University
College of Law.28 Charles left DePaul for William & Mary in 1979.29
According to his wife Denise, whom he married some years later, the FTC made
a real impression on Charles. It gave him his love for administrative law. He talked with
her particularly about his involvement in the funeral home rule, which was a big expe-
rience for him.30
II. DEVELOPING THE CASEBOOK
In 1981, after publishing several law review articles, Charles joined George Wash-
ington law professor Donald Rothschild in publishing the first edition of his casebook,
Fundamentals of Administrative Practice and Procedure: Cases and Materials.31 Al-
though I have not been able to confirm this, I suspect Charles knew Donald Rothschild
from his student days at George Washington. Professor Rothschild had joined the fac-
ulty in 1968, while Charles graduated in 1969.
Although quite different from the later editions, and not yet including the simula-
tion, the first edition emphasized that it was “an effort to provide materials for practical
legal education in how to practice before government agencies.”32 That interest in prac-
tical preparation for practice echoes through all of the later editions of the casebook, the
more so as the casebook became entirely his own. This Article will emphasize the later
editions, particularly the fourth, in which Charles fully incorporated his simulation into
the text.33 But the first edition offered some hints about what was to come.
First, the first edition includes a long note on the daily work of a member of the
FTC staff, with the following admonition:
You must always bear in mind that your job is not to prove the
rule but to gather as many facts as possible so as to help the Com-
missioners make their decision. Therefore, you should resist the
urge to become an advocate for the proposed rule and you should
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.; see also Charles H. Koch, Jr., Curriculum Vitae, supra note 5.
29 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Curriculum Vitae, supra note 5.
30 Telephone Interview with Denise Koch, Adjunct Professor of Law, William & Mary
Law Sch. (Jan. 30, 2013).
31 DONALD P. ROTHSCHILD & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (1981).
32 Id. at vii.
33 See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (4th ed.
2001) [hereinafter CASEBOOK (4th ed.)].
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seek comment from anyone who might help provide the necessary
information, including those who might oppose the rule.34
Here we see an emphasis on the duty to act as a steward of good government, just as
Mr. Penn described in our interview.
Second, the first edition appears to provide practical instruction by presenting the
elements of formal adjudicatory procedure in great detail, with a separate chapter of
seventy pages on prehearing process, including pleading, discovery, prehearing confer-
ences, and consent settlements.35 There is a similar chapter of 113 pages on the various
stages of formal adjudicatory hearings.36 This emphasis appears to reflect the more for-
mal processes of an earlier era, particularly at the FTC.
Finally, we see a faith in human, particularly judicial, ability to modify and manage
systems for the public good. In discussing the process for informal rulemaking, particu-
larly the various exceptions to notice and comment, the text asserts, quoting one of
Charles’s articles from 1976:
A better approach, however, would be the evolution of a broad
range of abbreviated public procedures through judicial review of
agencies’ promulgation procedures to ensure that the choice of pro-
cedures comports with basic notions of fairness and does not abuse
the agencies’ discretion.37
Unfortunately for this aspiration, the Supreme Court, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council38 in 1978, did not have such faith
in judicial ingenuity.39
Nearly a decade later, I had the great good fortune to submit a manuscript to the
Administrative Law Review (ALR) just after Charles had become Editor-in-Chief. He
made me an offer, which I declined on the advice of my betters that I should go with
the primary journal of a major state law school. He understood that advice and empa-
thized with my situation, even as he pressed to build the ALR into the outstanding
journal that it is today. In our recent conversation, David Penn told me that Charles was
particularly proud of his work on the ALR.40 In fact, Mr. Penn helped him attract
writers with economic expertise, including F. M. Scherer, a renowned economist and
Professor of Business and Government at the Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard.41 Professor Scherer published a strong critique of the Reagan Administration’s
34 See ROTHSCHILD & KOCH, supra note 31, at 41.
35 See id. at 101–70.
36 See id. at 171–284.
37 Id. at 513 (quoting Charles H. Koch, Jr., Public Procedures for the Promulgation of
Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEO. L.J. 1047, 1053–54 (1976)).
38 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
39 Id. at 549.
40 Telephone Interview with David W. Penn, supra note 17.
41 See F. M. Scherer, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., http://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty
-staff-directory/f.-m.-scherer (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
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“near obliteration” of the FTC’s role in collecting and disseminating information about
the functioning of American industry.42
When I eventually sent Charles a reprint, he responded with congratulations and
a request that I review the fictitious enabling act he had prepared for the second edi-
tion of his casebook.43 He had done a magnificent job of developing the Wine Trade
Commission Act from such diverse sources as the Solar Energy Research, Develop-
ment, and Demonstration Act of 1974;44 the Securities Act of 1933;45 the Federal Trade
Commission Act;46 and the Model State Administrative Procedure Act.47 I suggested
a citizen suit provision, which he then adapted from the Clean Water Act.48
Charles published the second edition of his casebook in 1991.49 He dedicated it to
his wife Denise, whom he had met in 1982 and married in 1985. Denise told me that
Charles had taken a wine appreciation course while living in Washington, D.C., after
which he became very interested in wine and began to amass a collection.50 That ap-
pears to have been the impetus for his choice of the Wine Trade Commission as his
fictitious agency. In the second edition and the third, which he published in 1996,51
Charles maintained that “[t]he pedagogical approach is traditional.”52 It was traditional
in the sense that Charles presented a collection of excerpted judicial opinions and note
materials from which a teacher could present a standard course in administrative law.
But Charles also reiterated the first edition’s commitment to a practical education in
administrative practice, noting that “[t]he overarching principle at work in this book is
a commitment to ‘applied’ administrative law.”53
This time, however, he included his simulation in the Teacher’s Manual, calling it
“Days of Wine and Regulation.”54 It was now possible to teach administrative law
entirely through the work of agency personnel and their counterparts in the private
sector. Ben, the new agency lawyer, began, for example, by asking “the big question:
should we promulgate a rule first or should we go immediately to a law enforcement
42 F. M. Scherer, Sunlight and Sunset at the Federal Trade Commission, 42 ADMIN. L. REV.
461, 461 (1990).
43 Letter from Charles H. Koch, Jr. to author (July 16, 1990) (on file with author).
44 42 U.S.C. §§ 5551–5566 (2006).
45 15 U.S.C. § 77a–77aa (2006).
46 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006).
47 MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (1981).
48 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
49 See CASEBOOK (2d ed.), supra note 2.
50 Telephone Interview with Denise Koch, supra note 30.
51 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1996)
[hereinafter CASEBOOK (3d ed.)].
52 Id. at viii; CASEBOOK (2d ed.), supra note 2, at viii.
53 CASEBOOK (3d ed.), supra note 51, at vii; CASEBOOK (2d ed.), supra note 2, at vii.
54 TEACHER’S MANUAL (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 181; CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., TEACHER’S
MANUAL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 194–219 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter
TEACHER’S MANUAL (3d ed.)].
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adjudication?”55 And he and Abby, his primary adversary representing the wine indus-
try, ended the simulation by discussing “the evolution of the WTC’s procedures and
their views on reforming administrative law based on their experiences and study.”56
In 1993, Charles sent me a revised version of the simulation, noting that recent
scholarship suggested to him that “the real innovative effort in rulemaking is happening
inside the agencies.”57 I responded with various comments. More important, our con-
tacts prompted me to try to arrange to meet Charles in Williamsburg as my family was
on the way home from summer vacation. We met at his office at 10:00 a.m. on an
August Sunday morning. It was the ultimate faculty scholar’s office: not very large, but
stuffed with paper, including a huge collection of what we used to know as advance
sheets. Charles was every bit as gracious as I expected. Perhaps because both of us had
lived for some years in the South, we had to that point addressed each other with the
formality of “Dear Professor Koch” and “Dear Professor Jordan.” That would end as
we met each other in person and as the Internet nearly destroyed such respectful saluta-
tions, a loss I suspect he regretted.
Charles continued the second edition approach in the third edition with a traditional
casebook presentation but a continued “commitment to ‘applied’ administrative law”58
and the simulation tucked in the back of the Teacher’s Manual. He finally took the
plunge in the fourth edition, fully integrating the simulation into the casebook.59 I have
no idea what it did to sales, but it actually shortened the book. From 1031 pages in the
second edition and 1,029 in the third, both without the simulation, the book was now
789 pages with the simulation fully integrated.60 I do not know why that happened, but
my sense is that the practicalities of addressing the issues as they arose throughout the
simulation were like the practicalities of practice. You have to know the key concepts
and the key authorities—although both sides argue them to opposite effects. You need
a sense of the underpinnings of the doctrines and the variations in views and interests,
which the notes provide in the casebook, but you do not have time for nearly three
hundred more pages, just as the agency practitioner must address the issues and move
on, perhaps picking up the latest twists at the Fall Conference of the ABA Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice.
III. THE SIMULATION—A STORY OF REAL PEOPLE
In all of its versions, the simulation involved the Wine Trade Commission, an inde-
pendent agency modeled on the FTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
This discussion describes the simulation as it had evolved by the fourth edition of the
casebook, with occasional reference to previous versions.
55 TEACHER’S MANUAL (2d ed.), supra note 3, Lesson 2.A.1 & 2, at S-3.
56 Id. at Lesson 7.D, at S-17.
57 Letter from Charles H. Koch, Jr. to author (Jan. 2, 1993) (on file with author).
58 CASEBOOK (3d ed.), supra note 51, at vii.
59 CASEBOOK (4th ed.), supra note 33, at 3–6.
60 See generally id.
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The core statutory provision, section 5 of the Wine Trade Commission Act,
makes it unlawful, in connection with the purchase or sale of wine in interstate com-
merce, to commit fraud or to “make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”61 Other provisions authorize
rulemaking,62 enforcement actions involving a “full hearing,”63 and the creation of the
private “Wine Merchants Association.”64 They also create a duty to promote the wine
industry65 and provide for judicial review66 and citizen suits.67
The story begins as Abby, who has joined a large Washington law firm from a
small Midwestern town, draws two letters from her apartment building mailbox, one
from her mother, the other from the D.C. Bar.68 Having passed the bar exam, she goes
for a celebratory drink at a nearby bar, where she encounters Ben, whom she had met
earlier that day at the Wine Trade Commission.69 Abby’s firm represents Gallery, a
large wine producer, while Ben recently joined the Office of General Counsel of the
Wine Trade Commission.70 Through their conversation, we learn the backgrounds of
the members of the new Commission, including a Chair rewarded for his political loy-
alty and members with varied backgrounds and attitudes.71 It seemed appropriate that
two were named Fred and Barney in light of “their stone age mentality.”72 Perhaps this
is a glimpse of the members of the FTC as Charles joined the agency just prior to its
rejuvenation. We also meet Chris, a shrewd, experienced government lawyer as General
Counsel, and Ralph, a former criminal trial attorney now Assistant General Counsel.73
He and Ben will battle over whether the Wine Trade Commission’s procedure should
be more or less adversarial in nature.
We learn that Ben’s mother is “an irrepressible public interest advocate”74 and that
he looks forward to “an entertaining venture in the defense of the public interest.”75 The
judge for whom he had clerked had told him, “Working for a new or revitalizing agency
is the most fun in government,” and he was already “surprisingly responsible for foun-
dational decisions about enforcement strategy and methods of proceeding.”76
61 Id. § 5(b), at 795–96.
62 Id. § 8(a), at 798.
63 Id. § 7(a)(1), at 797.
64 Id. § 6(b), at 796.
65 Id. § 3(a), at 794.
66 Id. § 9, at 799.
67 Id. § 12, at 802.
68 Id. at 3–4.
69 Id. at 4.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 5–6.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 4.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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Is this Charles? We cannot know, but this is the very circumstance in which Charles
found himself, as described by David Penn.77 Although not new, the FTC was revitaliz-
ing in response to the remarkable phenomenon of Nader’s Raiders. Charles, David
Penn, and so many others were excited about serving the public interest in the intermi-
nable struggle against special interests. And the young agency lawyers took on signifi-
cant responsibilities very quickly. They gathered the data, developed the record, and
wrote the rules, just as we see Ben doing in the simulation.
Throughout the simulation, Ben, Abby, Ralph, and the others battle over policy,
argue over procedures, and ultimately end up in court, with all the struggles over access
and standards of review.78 It seems so real. Those of us who were there sat in those long
meetings (in my case choking on the smoke of the program director’s cigars at the
Department of Housing and Urban Development), reviewed those records, produced
draft after draft of regulatory language, and filed those pleadings (or, in our case,
much to our chagrin, worked with the Department of Justice as they filed pleadings on
our behalf).
Just as the practice experiences seem real, so do the relationships. Ben and Abby
meet early in their careers. Will something come of it? In the second edition, Abby and
Ben’s initial encounter begins with Abby considering whether to ask him in and Ben
saying, nervously, “Well, tomorrow is a busy day for me,” and turning away “wonder-
ing whether he should have asked to come in.”79 In a description that seems to come
from his own or his friends’ experience, Charles writes, “The moment, if there was one,
was lost and their relationship turned in the direction of one of those male/female rela-
tionships made closer and more permanent by the fact that it never quite blossomed into
romance.”80 Ben and Abby remain good friends, with Abby preparing a gourmet meal
to celebrate Ben’s promotion to Chief of the Rulemaking Division, even as Abby has
become the new General Counsel of the American Wine Merchant’s Association.81 Still
not romantically involved, they each find “special enjoyment in sharing personal tri-
umphs with the other.”82 In the fourth edition, for reasons we do not know, Ben and
Abby do not seem to get so close to romance. They ultimately become good friends, but
Abby marries Ben’s colleague Ralph and moves with him to Cleveland, taking a law-
related job in a standards laboratory. As the simulation ends, she returns to Washington
for a meeting, where she sees Ben “holding court” among various bigwigs, seeming “a
bit more pompous and self-involved than when she left.”83 Still, she knows he will be
delighted to learn to learn of “the imminent arrival of her son.”84 Just as we sat in the
meetings and filed the pleadings, we were or knew the people in these personal stories.
77 Telephone Interview with David W. Penn, supra note 17.
78 See generally CASEBOOK (4th ed.), supra note 33.
79 TEACHER’S MANUAL (2d ed.), supra note 3, at S-2.
80 Id.
81 See generally id.
82 Id. at S-8.
83 CASEBOOK (4th ed.), supra note 33, at 789.
84 Id.
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IV. CHARLES KOCH IN THE CASEBOOK AND THE SCHOLARSHIP
Any scholar’s body of work, whether scholarly articles or casebooks, reflects the
author’s concerns. We can try to discern the scholar’s attitudes and beliefs, even the na-
ture of the scholar’s mind, from that legacy, in Charles’s case a unique casebook and
more than thirty articles, not to mention his many other contributions to administrative
law.85 The nature of the casebook as a story that seems drawn from his experience
heightens the sense that his concerns were personal and deeply held, not those of a de-
tached scholar isolated in the ivory tower. In the discussion that follows, I draw upon
the casebook and the scholarship in an effort to understand Charles more fully.
A. Belief in the Need for Active Government
Although the casebook appropriately presents the role of government as an open
question,86 Ben (or perhaps Charles?), as we have already seen, embodies faith in the
ability of active government to promote the public interest. Charles asserted both the
need for active government and his faith in its possibilities in Cooperative Surplus: The
Efficiency Justification for Active Government,87 in which he responded to Richard
Epstein’s assertion of “strong constitutional protection for economic liberties.”88
To Charles, Epstein ignored “the very purpose of our joining together into a coop-
erative society.”89 We enter into the “social contract” because “joining a society creates
a ‘cooperative surplus’ from which we all may benefit.”90 Our ability to interact in soci-
ety creates a surplus that we could not have achieved alone. He found it constitutionally
legitimate to require redistribution of wealth, not only for humanitarian purposes, but
also for the utilitarian reason that government provision of food and housing for five
people has a greater value than “the second BMW the millionaire would have pur-
chased with” the $25,000 taken from the millionaire in taxes.91 Although Charles pre-
sented this proposition as an argument, not his personal social-welfare position, it
is surely the argument of a supporter of active government.
At least two other articles, not to mention his entire career in administrative law,
reflect this commitment. In Effective Regulatory Reform Hinges on Motivating the
85 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Curriculum Vitae, supra note 5.
86 See, e.g., CASEBOOK (4th ed.), supra note 33, at 6, 29; see also id. at 17 (suggesting
“skepticism about the methods” of the regulatory state to achieve its goals); id. at 33 (asking
which New Deal arguments for the administrative state Abby might “feel uncomfortable as-
serting today” in explaining agencies).
87 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Cooperative Surplus: The Efficiency Justification for Active
Government, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 431 (1990).
88 Id. at 431.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 433.
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“Street Level” Bureaucrat,92 published in 1986 in honor of the fortieth anniversary of
the Administrative Procedure Act, Charles responded to the growing pressure for dereg-
ulation, which he said was “grounded in social policy thinking that varies little from
that supporting the ‘liberty of contract’ doctrines that held sway just prior to the expan-
sion [of the] administrative process.”93 Although presented in rather theoretical and neu-
tral terms, this statement surely reflects a revulsion against the social and economic
conditions (child labor and the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire, for example) permitted
by the attitudes of Lochner v. New York94 and eventually addressed by the rise of the
modern administrative state. He warned, rather modestly, that “care requires that we not
overcompensate as we shift the weight away from government.”95
He struck a similar tone a decade later in James Landis: The Administrative
Process,96 his paean to this giant of the administrative state. The very fact that Charles
chose to commemorate Landis’s career suggests that Charles shared Landis’s view of
the need for and possibilities of active government. As he ended the article, Charles
made this point directly, asserting that “[u]nless we become somehow an altruistic
species, we cannot exist in such close proximity without some order and enforced co-
operation. If that does not come from government, then where?”97
B. Faith in Administrative Systems
The casebook frequently tasks Ben and his colleagues with designing systems or
procedures to achieve the agency’s goals.98 Beyond the minima required by the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act or the Wine Trade Commission Act, the question is no longer
what is required, but what is the best approach, and can that approach serve the public
interest? In the rulemaking context, how can the agency best develop the record? What,
if anything, should it add to the standard notice-and-comment process to provide the
soundest possible basis for the agency’s decision? In the adjudicatory context, particu-
larly informal adjudication, Charles again tasks Ben and his colleagues with determin-
ing not only what the statute requires of the agency, but how best to structure the
process to achieve the fairness, efficiency, and accuracy so important to sound decision-
making, legitimacy, and public acceptance.
92 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Effective Regulatory Reform Hinges on Motivating the “Street
Level” Bureaucrat, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 427 (1986) [hereinafter Koch, Effective Regulatory
Reform].
93 Id. at 429.
94 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
95 Koch, Effective Regulatory Reform, supra note 92, at 430.
96 Charles H. Koch, Jr., James Landis: The Administrative Process, 48 ADMIN. L. REV.
419 (1996).
97 Id. at 433 (internal citation omitted).
98 See, e.g., CASEBOOK (4th ed.), supra note 33, Lesson 2A.3, at 134 (considering and
making grants); id. at Lesson 5B.1, at 452 (rulemaking); id. at Lesson 5C.1, at 488 (internal pro-
cesses for developing a rule); id. at Lesson 6A.1, at 533 (reconsidering grants).
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Charles’s scholarship reflects a faith in the ability to design complex administrative
systems to achieve our collective goals. Through most of his career, those systems were
complex bureaucracies, or perhaps the judiciary. By the time of his encounter with the
electricity industry, however, he seemed to seek more of a structural solution rather
than one that involved implementation by the politically influenced bureaucracy.
In his early work on the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),99 he sought both
more and better disclosure, in part out of concerns about the burden on the agency staff.
Arguing that the FOIA disclosure system primarily benefited private interests to the
point of abuse and failed to educate the public as intended, he argued for greater reli-
ance upon agencies and particular private actors, such as the media and researchers, to
improve the system.100 For example, he argued that we should reconceive the public in-
formation system without blaming government workers:
This can be accomplished by considering the actions of a hypo-
thetical “right-thinking” agency official who wants nothing more
than to serve the public and to comply with the letter and intent of
the FOIA. Through this hypothetical bureaucrat, analysis must
focus on the structural defects that cannot be attributed to gov-
ernment employees.101
Agencies would change from mere conduits to bodies with “an affirmative duty . . . to
insure that the public is informed about official activities.”102 This would not be a sys-
tem to reduce disclosure, but to move from undifferentiated disclosure almost entirely
for private purposes to educationally effective disclosure in which the public would
learn the reasons for agency actions.103 He saw administrative oversight, such as that
undertaken by the Department of Justice, as “more effective and efficient than judicial
enforcement.”104 Although the articles reflect an understanding of bureaucratic obstacles
to full disclosure as well as of private abuses, fundamentally these proposals reveal a
sense that the administrative system can be improved, in part by relying more fully on
the good faith and professional integrity of those in the bureaucracy.
Several other articles reflect this faith in human ability to harness complex systems
for the public good. Charles’s 1996 tribute to James Landis105 describes Landis’s strong
99 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestions for Making
Information Available to the Public, 32 MD. L. REV. 189 (1972); Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Barry
R. Rubin, A Proposal for a Comprehensive Restructuring of the Public Information System, 1979
DUKE L.J. 1.
100 Koch & Rubin, supra note 99, at 34–46.
101 Id. at 10.
102 Id. at 41.
103 Id. at 44.
104 Id.
105 See generally Koch, James Landis: The Administrative Process, supra note 96.
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faith in the ability of government to harness expertise and specialization for the public
good.106 After reading the rest of Charles’s scholarship, I found his description of
Landis to be a description of himself. Here, for example, is Charles’s description of
Landis’s “growing emphasis on personnel and personnel management”107:
Rather than “radical surgery,” he urged Hoover, “[t]he real solu-
tion . . . lay in attracting talented personnel and giving them power
to carry out their tasks.” In his own study, he observed: “The prime
key to the improvement of the administrative process is the se-
lection of qualified personnel. Good men can make poor laws
workable; poor men will wreak havoc with good laws.” While he
advocated merit selection and compensation, he urged that the key
to improvement lay in independence and challenge.108
For both men, expertise is legitimate and vital. Government systems are necessary and
can work effectively. But the key is the people—in Charles’s case, the people he had
known and with whom he had worked.
In the second edition, we saw, through a quote from his 1976 article, Public Proce-
dures for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy,109
that Charles shared the faith that judicial review could improve the legislative rule-
making system. He revealed that attitude in his work on review of agency exercise of
discretion. For example, in his early article on this topic, Confining and Controlling
Administrative Discretion Within the Seventh Circuit110 (before Vermont Yankee), he
argued that “[t]he development of administrative agencies results from responses to
practical problems and, hence, the growth of administrative process concepts has pro-
ceeded along pragmatic lines.”111 Urging reliance upon “judicial development,” he
wrote that:
The answers may lie in the careful thinking that has been done
in confining and controlling administrative discretion. The best of
this thinking has recognized the practical problems and has set
forth principles which can reform administrative decision—pro-
tecting the citizen from harmful government action—without
preventing the government from functioning for the benefit of
its citizens.112
106 Id. at 427.
107 Id. at 432.
108 Id. (citations omitted).
109 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
110 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Confining and Controlling Administrative Discretion Within the
Seventh Circuit, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 275 (1977) [hereinafter Koch, Confining and Controlling
Administrative Discretion Within the Seventh Circuit].
111 Id. at 308.
112 Id. at 305, 308.
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He was referring to the thinking of judges, particularly the Seventh Circuit.
He came back to the theme of judicial ability to handle complex systems in An
Issue-Driven Strategy for Review of Agency Decisions.113 In the wake of National
Labor Relations Board v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.,114 Charles attacked what he
called the “word formula system” for determining the nature of judicial review.115 His
term “word formula system” referred particularly to the fact that the application of arbi-
trary and capricious or substantial evidence review was determined by the nature of the
process the agency had used to make the decision in question.116 He argued that the
“word formula system,” perhaps adequate for a simpler time, failed when it came to
complex administrative decisions because it “lack[ed] flexibility.”117 Because this sys-
tem “leads a court to evaluate an entire administrative decision, no matter how com-
plex, under a single review standard,” it “robs the review system of both flexibility
and precision.”118
In its stead, Charles argued for review based upon the nature of the decision in
question. This may seem an unsurprising proposition more than two decades later, but
Charles was not simply arguing for different approaches to review of policy or fact, as
in Curtin Matheson Scientific.119 With respect to review of policy, he asserted that some
informal statements that “are not the direct result of the delegated authority to make
rules” should nonetheless be subject to limited review.120 This seems to simplify things
somewhat, but his real point was that “[i]f the review system is to rationally allocate de-
cisionmaking functions, it must do so according to all the factors affecting the relative
decisionmaking advantages of the courts and the bureaucracy and not just the nature of
the administrative decisionmaking process.”121 Thus, he challenged the court to do a
better job. Perhaps it will be necessary to take into account more than just the procedure
used by the agency, but that more demanding task will produce a better result.
He made much the same point as to review of facts. Not content to rely upon the
word formula labels, which could result in different scrutiny for essentially similar
facts, he argued that review of facts should depend upon the nature of the factual
decisions.122 The involvement of specific or general facts was more important than the
type of proceeding implemented by the agency. Generally, specific facts are subject
to greater scrutiny, but he questioned whether general facts should at times be sub-
ject to greater scrutiny, while judicial review of specific facts may not be appropriate
113 Charles H. Koch, Jr., An Issue-Driven Strategy for Review of Agency Decisions, 43
ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 512 (1991) [hereinafter Koch, An Issue-Driven Strategy].
114 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
115 Koch, An Issue-Driven Strategy, supra note 113, at 519.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 520–21.
118 Id. at 521, 522.
119 494 U.S. at 776–81.
120 Koch, An Issue-Driven Strategy, supra note 113, at 523.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 528.
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for the “millions of findings of specific fact” that agencies make every day.123 As he
put it, “the degree of agency dominance over specific facts should be measured by the
bureaucracy’s ‘comparative advantage.’ . . . The system, and a reviewing court, should
base its acceptance of administrative decisions in a specific program on some judgment
as to the value of the judicial contribution.”124
He proposed a very complex system, one that depended upon the ability of judges
to evaluate various disparate circumstances and determine the best degree of review for
the particular decision.125 His faith in judges to handle this complexity was similar to
his 1976 argument, discussed above, that we should rely upon judicial review to drive
the “evolution of a broad range of abbreviated public procedures.”126
Another, rather different, example of Charles’s faith in human implementation of
complex schemes is A Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus,127 a com-
prehensive, complex effort to refocus due process procedural decisions on intertwined
interests of individual and community, rather than setting individual and community
against each other, as in Mathews v. Eldridge.128 Charles emphasized sensitivity to both
individual concerns, such as personal dignity, and the community’s concerns as a
collection of individuals, as opposed to the community’s concerns as an institution.129
Much more complex than the utilitarian balance of Mathews v. Eldridge, this would
not be a simple effort. I shuddered at Justice Scalia’s likely reaction to such a com-
plex approach, with its inherent faith in the individual judge to take so many factors
into account.
Charles’s late-career work on the electricity industry, which grew out of his rela-
tionship with David Penn, suggests an interesting combination of faith in human ability
to design a complex regulatory system and a concern with the politically influenced and
parochial attitudes of some regulators. The result is a turn toward a largely private sys-
tem in which controls are achieved by a system of checks and balances among compet-
ing interests rather than through direct commands by regulatory bodies. In Control and
Governance of Transmission Organizations in the Restructured Electricity Industry,130
Charles tackled the extremely complex effort to restructure the electricity industry.131
In his most extensive examination of a particular substantive area of the regulatory
state, Charles seemed almost to recreate the regulatory state for this particular sector of
the economy. Driven by the reality that transmission appeared to be an inescapable
123 Id. at 527.
124 Id. at 527–28.
125 Id. at 558.
126 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
127 Charles H. Koch, Jr., A Community of Interest in Due Process Calculus, 37 HOUS. L. REV.
635 (2000) [hereinafter Koch, A Community of Interest].
128 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See generally Koch, A Community of Interest, supra note 127.
129 Koch, A Community of Interest, supra note 127, at 696.
130 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Control and Governance of Transmission Organizations in the
Restructured Electricity Industry, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 569 (2000).
131 See id. at 571.
396 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:381
natural monopoly, Charles argued for regional, rather than state, control of transmission
through nonprofit Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs).132 The regional ap-
proach was necessary to avoid parochial state interests,133 while the nonprofit model
was necessary because for-profit RTOs would raise “a real specter of unbridled market
power, which, at best, will mean the perpetuation of the regulatory regime.”134 He em-
phasized, however, that “particular care must be taken in designing the internal policy-
making, standard setting, and dispute resolution processes” for the RTOs.135
Five years later, Charles addressed that very issue. In Collaborative Governance
in the Restructured Electricity Industry,136 he drew upon principles of “collaborative
governance” articulated by Jody Freeman137 to propose “a governance model that will
better serve problem solving and satisfy all the various interests that are involved in the
substance as well as the form of governance.”138 He again argued for a private, non-
profit scheme in which nonprofit RTOs would perform the regulatory function.139 The
key was governance structures in which RTOs would be operated by “representative”
committees that would assure broader interests, including consumers and similar less
powerful groups, would balance parochial industry and state interests in controlling
transmission of electric power.140 He insisted upon “real influence for groups that were
industry outsiders under the old vertically integrated regime.”141 Here, again, is the
realist who understands the powerful forces of vested interests and the idealist who as-
serts those forces can be controlled through effective participation by and allocation
of power to all involved. He concluded that “[a]ttention to principles of participation
(real rather than apparent), accountability, and transparency will foster community
satisfaction. But those features will also enhance the overall performance of the RTO-
governing institutions.”142
In 2009, he took those lessons overseas in Collaborative Governance: Lessons for
Europe from U.S. Electricity Restructuring.143 Examining the European Union (EU)
situation in detail, Charles argued for a nonprofit RTO-type model, but he recognized
132 Id. at 584–86.
133 Id. at 586 (explaining that RTOs are forced to make objective-based regulatory decisions
and thus are in a better position to make decisions than state or federal regulators).
134 Id. at 613.
135 Id.
136 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Collaborative Governance in the Restructured Electricity Industry,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 589 (2005).
137 Id. at 589–90 (citing Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997)).
138 Id. at 591.
139 See id. at 589, 592.
140 Id. at 591–92.
141 Id. at 601.
142 Id. at 615.
143 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Collaborative Governance: Lessons for Europe from U.S. Electricity
Restructuring, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 71 (2009) [hereinafter Koch, Collaborative Governance:
Lessons for Europe from U.S. Electricity Restructuring].
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the EU is hampered by a regulatory structure unlike that in the United States.144 Here,
we have the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) as well as state regulators.
FERC has provided us with a means of moving away from state control to a regional
model. The EU, however, accomplishes regulation through its member states, without
a version of FERC to ease the transition.145 Nonetheless, Charles argued for the regional
model because the U.S. experience had shown that “regulatory cooperation will not get
the job done.”146 Reflecting his belief in the need for some form of regulatory control,
he said:
As Adam Smith observed some years ago, business people coming
together is never good for the rest of us. ISO/RTO enables grid co-
operation with much less opportunity to jointly act against the pub-
lic or competitors. Indeed, it evolved from business people, both
industry members and their customers, seeking a cooperative orga-
nization they could trust.147
In an interesting evolution of his thinking, Charles said of the U.S. experience:
In sum, the private government-like services—including manage-
ment, rulemaking, enforcement, and dispute settlement—solve
many of the governmental tasks without many of the disadvantages
of direct governmental involvement. Such entities serve well the
sophisticated and complex tasks involved in governing the core
segment of the electricity industry, bulk transmission. Fairness,
competence, efficiency, and legitimacy radiate out to the entire in-
dustry and ultimately to the society it serves.148
C. Understanding of and Faith in the People of the Bureaucracy
As with James Landis, Charles’s faith in the ability of government to implement
programs to address complex problems perhaps necessarily included faith in the bureau-
crats administering the system—the agency personnel and the administrative judges.
As with his belief in what government could do, his work suggests that his faith in the
144 See id. at 77–78 (explaining the difference between the independent system operator op-
tions in Europe and the United States and suggesting that the European solution is to move to-
ward nonprofit ISO/RTO models).
145 Id. at 88.
146 Id. at 96.
147 Id. at 95. “ISO” refers to “independent systems operator,” while “RTO” refers to “Regional
Transmission Organization.” As described by Charles, both would be nonprofit and reflect many
interests. See id. at 77.
148 Id. at 81.
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bureaucrats seems to have eroded somewhat over time. Perhaps he simply became
more realistic.
As discussed earlier, Charles proposed an administrative system for resolving
FOIA disputes in part because he had faith in the bureaucrats—the individuals—who
would implement such a system.149 Charles saw similar opportunities for improvement
after his extensive examination of the Social Security Disability appeals system for
the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), as reported in The
Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security
Administration’s Appeals Council.150 Despite the fact that the appeals system had
many flaws and resulted in changes in only five percent of the outcomes,151 Charles
and his co-author argued that it should not be abolished, “at least not before one more
effort at serious reform.”152 Noting that the Appeals Council was “composed of tal-
ented and dedicated individuals” performing diverse tasks that were impossible to
accomplish, they proposed a system-reform approach in which attention would turn
from a “case correction” model to having the Appeals Council suggest new policies,
develop new practices, and implement new experiments.153 Here, again, is an expression
of faith in the possibility of a complex system and of those implementing the system
if given the appropriate task.
Several other articles reflect this attitude. In Effective Regulatory Reform Hinges
on Motivating the “Street Level” Bureaucrat, four years before the above study,
Charles argued that structural solutions were not enough to respond to the antigovern-
ment attitude of the deregulatory movement.154 Rather, we must give attention to the
attitudes and incentives of the “street level” bureaucrat, the one most often encountered
by members of the public.155 Recognizing that the workforce ranges from excellent to
awful and acknowledging that bureaucrats are often strongly risk-averse and inflexible,
among other flaws, he urged attention to “methods aimed at motivating administrative
decisionmakers, especially those at the implementing or ‘street level,’ to further such
goals as fairness, correctness, dignity, and satisfaction.”156 Through a new code of pro-
fessionalism, we could create “a new class of professionals who will acquire the pride
of professionals in their work.”157 Ideally, a high regard for bureaucrats would improve
149 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
150 Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the
Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 199, 202–03 (1990).
151 Id. at 288 (citation omitted).
152 Id. at 319.
153 Id. at 318–19.
154 Koch, Effective Regulatory Reform, supra note 92, at 448–49.
155 Id. at 432–33.
156 Id. at 427–28.
157 Id. at 443.
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their performance, as is said to be true in Europe.158 We might characterize this proposal
as a combination of hard-bitten realism about the difficulties we face and an idealistic,
human-centered, hopeful approach to a possible solution.
As Charles returned eight years later to an emphasis on the people doing the job,
Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary159 addressed the fact that administrative
law judges [ALJs] and other presiding officers will inevitably make agency policy.160
Recognizing that vertical controls—essentially appeals to agency heads—cannot pos-
sibly assure uniformity of policy in administrative decisions, Charles argued that
agencies must acknowledge this policymaking role and “incorporate it in to their pol-
icymaking arsenal.”161 Given the ineffectiveness of the adjudicative hierarchy, that ef-
fort becomes one of educating the administrative judiciary about agency policy. In
addition to the vertical approach of having the adjudicators follow the agency’s nonleg-
islative statements of interpretation or policy, this proposal would recognize that the
adjudicators are part of the organic policymaking system of the agency.162 Through
advisory committees or other gatherings, the administrative judiciary could contrib-
ute to the development of policy by the agency itself and be made fully aware of the
agency’s existing policy decisions.163 Once again, the focus is on the individuals doing
the work. With appropriate attention to potential problems, agencies should have faith
in those individuals and rely upon them at the same time agencies educate them as to
existing policies.
Several articles in the latter part of Charles’s career hint at growing concerns about
the performance of individual bureaucrats (primarily ALJs, a rather special category of
bureaucrat) and about administrative systems to the extent they are strongly subject to
political influence. In Administrative Presiding Officials Today,164 published in 1994,
Charles reported on an ACUS survey of ALJs and administrative judges.165 His conclu-
sions and tone are dramatically different from the positive sense one draws from most
of his work. He said, for example:
This responsibility gave me a very close look at the administrative
law judge (ALJ) corps. What I saw was, to put it bluntly, alarming.
My biases are always with the government employees and offi-
cials, having been one myself. Indeed, I dedicated my treatise to
158 See id. (citing L. BROWN & J. GARNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 15–17 (2d
ed. 1973)).
159 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV.
693 (2005).
160 Id. at 694–96.
161 Id. at 712.
162 Id. at 740.
163 Id. at 719–20.
164 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 271
(1994) [hereinafter Koch, Administrative Presiding Officials Today].
165 Id.
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civil servants. Still, the more I dealt with the ALJ corps, the more
concerned I became. The system has some very serious personnel
problems and real, practical solutions are being supplanted by theo-
retical ones.166
He found that an unacceptable number of presiding officers, particularly ALJs, did
not “perform their function fairly and with an acceptable level of competence and
diligence.”167 They were too isolated from criticism and needed some sort of indepen-
dent monitoring system, perhaps an ombudsman, so that identifying and addressing
the performance of presiding officers would not depend upon individual complaints.168
He emphasized “one very strong conclusion”:
The present ALJ corp [sic] simply has too many people who
should not be in a position of judging others, especially those with
no power. The selection process must be designed to assure that
citizens meet the right kind of individual when they come before
the government. I would go so far as to suggest serious consider-
ation of sophisticated personality testing.169
Interestingly, Charles did not find the answer in structural or system-design solutions:
“[T]he structural and formalized solutions are not as effective as less formal ap-
proaches.”170 He focused on the problems of presiding officers as individualized fail-
ures in need of individualized solutions.171 While he proposed structural responses, he
returned to an emphasis on the individuals involved in the system: “Our survey, as
did the others, discovered an overwhelming commitment to personal and systemic
integrity.”172 He urged attention to hiring the right people, reducing the emphasis on
a litigation background, and turning from undue formality to take advantage of proce-
dural flexibility.173 Ultimately, much as he suggested looking to “street level” bureau-
crats,174 he urged that we “look beyond traditional, legalistic structure and search for
more practical, human solutions.”175
D. Interest in Foreign Models of Governance
In his clearest break from the co-authored first edition of the casebook, Charles
brought European perspectives on governance and administration to bear upon the
166 Id. at 271 (footnote omitted).
167 Id. at 272.
168 Id. at 272–73.
169 Id. at 275.
170 Id. at 281.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 287.
173 Id. at 292–93.
174 See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
175 Koch, Administrative Presiding Officials Today, supra note 164, at 295.
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students’ consideration of American legal principles, even American sacred cows. In
addition to describing the European roots of the modern welfare state,176 Charles chal-
lenged the student with references to natural law177 and the inquisitorial model of the
French Conseil d’État and the droit administratif.178 These materials require us to go
beyond the relatively mundane legal issues, such as what constitutes a property interest
or whether cross-examination should be allowed, to consider what we are truly trying
to accomplish and whether there are ways to do it that are quite beyond our legal and
cultural experiences. To give other examples, Charles questioned whether the United
States should have adopted the approach, common in many countries, of presenting
questions “to the courts prior to the final legislative or administrative decision,”179 or
the ombudsman concept originally adopted in Sweden in 1713.180 All of these examples
inherently raise the question of what it means to be free and how best to govern fairly
and effectively.
Interestingly, Charles’s wife Denise had the impression that his interest in compara-
tive administrative law came relatively late in his career, with the European Union proj-
ect of the Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice of the American Bar
Association.181 She said that once he came upon it, he said, “the EU is the biggest ad-
ministrative agency in the world,” and American lawyers were not paying enough
attention to it. As a result, he built and taught a course in EU law. According to Denise,
“the EU was like a big playground for him.”182
In fact, Charles revealed his interest in comparative administrative law, and the EU
in particular, from the very beginning. His student law review note, The Application of
Article 85, Paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Rome to Intrastate Exclusive Distributorship
Agreement,183 examined a European Court of Justice ruling that a Belgian exclusive do-
mestic distributorship agreement could be reached under the Treaty of Rome if it was
“‘likely to affect trade between the Member States’ of the Common Market.”184 Accord-
ing to Charles, the decision opened “the door to the elimination of barriers raised by
agreements within one Member State.”185
Charles returned to comparative work in 1981 with “Some Kind of Hearing” in
England,186 in which he compared U.S. due process and the concept of “natural justice,”
176 CASEBOOK (4th ed.), supra note 33, at 22–23.
177 Id. at 151.
178 Id. at 139–42.
179 Id. at 253.
180 Id.
181 Telephone Interview with Denise Koch, supra note 30.
182 Id.
183 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Note, The Application of Article 85, Paragraph 1, of the Treaty of
Rome to Intrastate Exclusive Distributorship Agreement: S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. Consorts
Wilkins-Janssen, 2 CCH Com. Mkt. Rep. ¶ 8053 (1967), 3 J.L. & ECON. DEV. 254 (1968).
184 Id. at 254 (citation omitted).
185 Id. at 260.
186 Charles H. Koch, Jr., “Some Kind of Hearing” in England, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV.
219 (1981).
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both of which experienced explosions at roughly the same time.187 Despite English criti-
cism about overjudicialization in the United States, Charles found that after a period of
misdirection through excessive attention to the trial model and struggle with semantics,
we had reached the point where we could, in both adjudication and rulemaking, “seek
practical answers to the tough questions of good government.”188 He found, however,
that English “law still may have to struggle through an era of commitment to the
trial model.”189
Charles again returned to comparative law in 2002, with the first of six articles
seeking to enhance international and cross-cultural understanding of administrative
processes. In Judicial Review and Global Federalism,190 Charles argued that the agree-
ment to strengthen and extend the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was
about more than mere free trade.191 It was really about “the emergence of a world
government.”192 Charles described the centralizing effect of judicial review in the
EU,193 compared U.S. federalism to the EU’s concept of “subsidiarity,”194 and argued
that we were moving toward a “general concession of national sovereignty to supra-
national institutions.”195 This article was a heartfelt plea for U.S. lawyers to catch up,
combined with optimism about our ability to do so:
The relative parochialism of the U.S. legal community is a severe
handicap, but U.S. lawyers have advantages, one of which is that
U.S. lawyers are comfortable with a federal system. While consid-
erable catching up is in order, U.S. lawyers are well equipped to
deal with the concept of global federalism.196
The second article, Envisioning a Global Legal Culture,197 built on the first as
Charles described the common-law and civil-law systems as likely sources of the legal
culture for “an increasingly empowered supranational government.”198 Charles sought
to begin the conversation by providing “the framework for projecting the evolution of
the global legal culture.”199 Once again, he admonished American lawyers “to learn
187 Id. at 220.
188 Id. at 258–59.
189 Id. at 259.
190 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review and Global Federalism, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
491 (2002).
191 See generally id.
192 Id. at 491.
193 Id. at 492.
194 Id. at 503.
195 Id. at 492.
196 Id. at 511 (footnote omitted).
197 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2003).
198 Id. at 75.
199 Id.
2013] CHARLES KOCH, JR.—THE CASEBOOK AND THE SCHOLARSHIP 403
about the world’s legal cultures, starting with the often quite unfamiliar ideologies and
practices of the continental European systems.”200
In the third article, The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design as the Model
for Emerging Legal Systems,201 Charles urged that emerging legal systems turn to the
civil law as the model for their judicial systems.202 By contrast with the common law,
civil-law judges have both more training and less leeway in their decisionmaking. As
with the American-administrative process, the system depends less on the private bar,
and the judges are more responsible for developing a sound record, at times bringing
specialized substantive expertise to the table.203 More trained to make decisions than to
litigate, the civil-law judges are more easily subjected to public scrutiny than the private
bar in the common-law system.204 This focus on better judges provides a way for
emerging legal cultures to improve relatively quickly and to prepare for their place
in a global legal culture that will largely derive from the common-law and civil-
law models.
The fourth article, Judicial Dialogue for Legal Multiculturalism,205 discusses how
the United States and other legal systems have traded and evolved concepts over
time.206 Charles urged respect for, continued dialogue with, and recognition of rights
under various legal concepts.207 He sought not the imposition of “universal principles,”
but continuous attention and sharing of concepts to develop better understanding across
cultures.208 Continuing the theme of the previous article, he noted, in particular, the im-
portance of assuring the best possible judges, as opposed to the best possible advo-
cates.209 He described U.S. administrative law as having “arrived at a similar strategy
in many instances,” such as emphasizing sound decisions rather than advocacy in the
Social Security adjudicatory system.210 He ultimately argued that “[t]he process of
judicial exchange among a variety of tribunals, the justification of judicial positions,
and the advocacy that drives judicial resolution offers a formidable vehicle whereby
the global society can come to grips with the cacophony of legal cultures.”211
200 Id.
201 Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design as the Model for
Emerging Legal Systems, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 139 (2004).
202 Id. at 140.
203 Id. at 152–53.
204 Id. at 140.
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The fifth article, Devolution of Implementing Policymaking in Network Govern-
ments,212 contrasts the hierarchical U.S. federal system with what he terms the more
horizontal “network system” of the EU’s reliance on strong member states and the
cross-boundary EU parliament to make and implement its policy decisions.213 Consis-
tent with his interest in policymaking by the U.S. administrative judiciary, Charles em-
phasized that policymaking at the point of implementation is inevitable.214 In the United
States, a degree of consistency can be achieved through the administrative hierarchy,
but that goal is elusive in a network system. The challenge for such a system, as
Charles saw it, is to “engender a sense of justice and legitimacy as policy is applied
to its citizens.”215
We have already seen the sixth article, the final one of his career, Collaborative
Governance: Lessons for Europe from U.S. Electricity Restructuring,216 in which he
sought to distill useful lessons from the American electricity deregulation experience
for the benefit of the EU.217 Together, these six articles, in the short space of seven
years, show us an internationalist who went far beyond the “natural justice” and Conseil
d’Etat references in his casebook to a deep commitment to helping legal communities
in this country and elsewhere understand the rapidly developing system of global gov-
ernance and the lessons we can draw from administrative law as we continue to create
that new system.
E. A Drive to Simplify
Although Charles wrote across a wide range of complex issues, he seemed to want
to simplify that complexity for the rest of us. One example comes from his early days
at DePaul. The other, ironically enough, is his body of work on the nature of discretion
and its review. I have not found an obvious hook in the casebook, except, perhaps, that
he slimmed it down in the fourth edition to focus on the essentials, as a practitioner
would do.
In his second article while still at the FTC, Prejudgment: An Unavailable Chal-
lenge to Official Administrative Action,218 Charles analyzed efforts to use charges of
decisionmaker prejudgment to challenge agency decisions.219 As the title indicates, he
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217 See id. at 72.
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found the challenge largely unavailable. He presented the analysis in the hope that
“agencies will learn to avoid charges of illegal prejudgment” and to discourage “certain
of the more frivolous challenges by the administrative law bar.”220 As he explained,
only prejudgment as to specific facts or personal bias will support such a challenge.
“Otherwise,” he hoped, “such challenges should no longer be seriously considered.”221
Ironically, his extensive and complex work on the nature and review of discretion
also illustrates his interest in simplification. He tackled this issue over several articles.
In the first, consistent with the practical focus of his casebook, he described the devel-
opment of the administrative state in very practical terms: “The development of admin-
istrative agencies results from responses to practical problems and, hence, the growth
of administrative process concepts has proceeded along pragmatic lines.”222 He held out
hope for answers from careful thinking about “confining and controlling administrative
discretion.”223 This seems to be the beginning of the process that David Penn described
as musing on larger issues, then using his “bear trap” mind to bring them down to what
we could do with them.
That effort continued through the ambitious Confining Judicial Authority Over
Administrative Action,224 a comprehensive explanation of both standards of review and
reviewability, and Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion,225 an explanation of
the nature of and the five types of discretion. His An Issue-Driven Strategy for Review
of Agency Decisions, described above,226 was an effort to bring those abstractions down
to earth, as was Judicial Review of Administrative Policymaking,227 in which, in the
wake of United States v. Mead Corp.,228 he emphasized the importance of distinguish-
ing statutory interpretation from administrative policymaking.229 Here, and again in
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild: An Old-Fashioned Remedy for What Ails Current
Judicial Review Law,230 Charles settled upon a fairly simple message: It is about the
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policy.231 Figure out what the statute requires. The rest is policy. Review policy,
whether the space left in a Chevron analysis232 or the exercise of judgment as autho-
rized by statute, under the standard designed for that purpose, arbitrary and capricious
review as captured in the concept of “hard look” review.233
CONCLUSION
This foray through seemingly disparate aspects of the Charles Koch, Jr. canon
began with the simulation’s demand, as agency practice itself demands, to develop pro-
cedures, processes, and systems to achieve the public good, whether through improving
upon our basic informal rulemaking, or determining, with little statutory guidance, how
best to implement informal adjudication. Charles did not hesitate to tackle that effort
more boldly and on a broader scale. He understood the need to rely upon the “street
level” bureaucrat to achieve our public goals, he sought ways to enhance their per-
formance, and he had faith that they and the judiciary could implement a complex
approach to due process, one that would more fully respect the dignity of the indi-
vidual as part of the community. And he took on the massive task of restructuring
the electricity industry, both here and in Europe. This was a man of great vision and
considerable courage.
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